Although we become virtuous by acting as the virtuous person does, a close reading of Aristotle’s text shows that, on his account, it is not enough to be virtuous that we act in certain ways. What’s needed, according to Aristotle, is that you knowingly act virtuously for its own sake from a stable character, and do so with pleasure. Professor Gendler turns to Julia Annas’s suggestion that Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi’s idea of flow may be helpful in characterizing the condition that you take pleasure in the virtuous act. Finally, a critique of virtue ethics from John Doris and situationist psychology is raised which offers experimental evidence that casts doubt on the existence of stable character traits.

1. Introduction
2. The Ring of Gyges: Morality and Hypocrisy
3. Parts of the Soul I
4. Parts of the Soul II
5. The Well-Ordered Soul: Happiness and Harmony
6. The Disordered Soul: Thémis and PTSD
7. Flourishing and Attachment
8. Flourishing and Detachment
9. Virtue and Habit I
10. Virtue and Habit II
11. Weakness of the Will and Procrastination
12. Utilitarianism and its Critiques
13. Deontology
14. The Trolley Problem
15. Empirically-informed Responses
16. Philosophical Puzzles
17. Punishment I
18. Punishment II
19. Contract & Commonwealth: Thomas Hobbes
20. The Prisoner's Dilemma
21. Equality
22. Equality II
23. Social Structures
24. Censorship
25. Tying up Loose Ends
26. Concluding Lecture

Philosophy and the Science of Human Nature pairs central texts from Western philosophical tradition (including works by Plato, Aristotle, Epictetus, Hobbes, Kant, Mill, Rawls, and Nozick) with recent findings in cognitive science and related fields. The course is structured around three intertwined sets of topics: Happiness and Flourishing; Morality and Justice; and Political Legitimacy and Social Structures.