Lecture Description
We first consider the alternative "Bertrand" model of imperfect competition between two firms in which the firms set prices rather than setting quantities. Then we consider a richer model in which firms still set prices but in which the goods they produce are not identical. We model the firms as stores that are on either end of a long road or line. Customers live along this line. Then we return to models of strategic politics in which it is voters that are spread along a line. This time, however, we do not allow candidates to choose positions: they can only choose whether or not to enter the election. We play this "candidate-voter game" in the class, and we start to analyze both as a lesson about the notion of equilibrium and a lesson about politics.
Course Index
- Introduction: Five First Lessons
- Putting Yourselves Into Other People's Shoes
- Iterative Deletion and the Median-Voter Theorem
- Best Responses in Soccer and Business Partnerships
- Nash Equilibrium: Bad Fashion and Bank Runs
- Nash Equilibrium: Dating and Cournot
- Nash Equilibrium: Shopping, Standing and Voting on a Line
- Nash Equilibrium: Location, Segregation and Randomization
- Mixed Strategies in Theory and Tennis
- Mixed Strategies in Baseball, Dating and Paying your Taxes
- Evolutionary Stability: Cooperation, Mutation, and Equilibrium
- Evolutionary Stability: Social Convention, Aggression, and Cycles
- Sequential Games: Moral Hazard, Incentives, and Hungry Lions
- Backward Induction: Commitment, Spies, and First-mover Advantages
- Backward Induction: Chess, Strategies, and Credible Threats
- Backward Induction: Reputation and Duels
- Backward Induction: Ultimatums and Bargaining
- Imperfect Information: Information Sets and Sub-game Perfection
- Subgame Perfect Equilibrium: Matchmaking and Strategic Investments
- Subgame Perfect Equilibrium: Wars of Attrition
- Repeated Games: Cooperation vs. the End Game
- Repeated Games: Cheating, Punishment, and Outsourcing
- Asymmetric Information: Silence, Signaling and Suffering Education
- Asymmetric Information: Auctions and the Winner's Curse
Course Description
This course is an introduction to game theory and strategic thinking. Ideas such as dominance, backward induction, Nash equilibrium, evolutionary stability, commitment, credibility, asymmetric information, adverse selection, and signaling are discussed and applied to games played in class and to examples drawn from economics, politics, the movies, and elsewhere.